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We consider the general problem of resource sharing in societal networks, consisting of interconnected com-
munication, transportation, energy and other networks important to the functioning of society. Participants
in such network need to take decisions daily, both on the quantity of resources to use as well as the periods
of usage. With this in mind, we discuss the problem of incentivizing users to behave in such a way that
society as a whole benefits. In order to perceive societal level impact, such incentives may take the form of
rewarding users with lottery tickets based on good behavior, and periodically conducting a lottery to trans-
late these tickets into real rewards. We will pose the user decision problem as a mean field game (MFG),
and the incentives question as one of trying to select a good mean field equilibrium (MFE). In such a frame-
work, each agent (a participant in the societal network) takes a decision based on an assumed distribution
of actions of his/her competitors, and the incentives provided by the social planner. The system is said to be
at MFE if the agent’s action is a sample drawn from the assumed distribution. We will show the existence
of such an MFE under general settings, and also illustrate how to choose an attractive equilibrium using as
an example demand-response in the (smart) electricity network.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Mean field games, societal networks, nudge system, lottery, smart grid
1. INTRODUCTION
There has recently been much interest in understanding societal networks, consisting
of interconnected communication, transportation, energy and other networks that are
important to the functioning of human society. These systems usually have a shared
resource component, and where the participants have to periodically take decisions
on when and how much to utilize such resources, but with indirect knowledge of the
aggregate utilization of the shared resource. Research into these networks often takes
the form of behavioral studies on decision making by the participants, and whether it
is possible to provide incentives to modify their behavior in such a way that the society
as a whole benefits [Merugu et al. 2009; Prabhakar 2013].
Our candidate application in this paper is that of a Load Serving Entity (LSE) or
a Load Aggregator (LA) (e.g., a utility company) trying to reduce its exposure to daily
electricity market volatility by incentivizing demand response in a Smart Grid setting.
The reason for our choice is the ready availability of data and reliable models for the
cost and payoff structure that enables a realistic study. The data used in this paper was
obtained from the Electric Reliability Council of Texas [ERCOT 2014], an organization
that manages the wholesale electricity market in the state. The price shows consider-
able variation, and peaks at about 5 PM each day, which is when maximum demand
occurs. A major source of this demand in Texas is air conditioning, which in each home
is of the order of 30 kWh per day [Pecan-Street 2014]. Incentivizing customers to move
a few kWh of peak-time usage to the sides of the peak each day could lead to much
reduced risks of peak price borne by the LSE. Such demand shaping could also have
a positive effect on environmental impact of power plant emissions, since supplying
peak load is associated with inefficient electricity generation.
As an example, we take the baseline temperature setpoint as 22.5◦C, and consider
a customer that every day increases the setpoint by 1◦C in 5 − 6 PM and decreases
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the setpoint by 0.5◦C in the off-peak times. We will see later that even such a small
change of the setpoint of the AC, the incentives to the users (a group of fifty homes)
can be tuned to achieve different trade-offs: either just a utility increase for the users,
just savings to the LSE (of the order of eighty dollars in our case) or any objective that
chooses some appropriate mix of the two. This result is under the implicit assumption
that the LSE in question is a price-taker so that changes in its demand profile are
assumed not to perturb the prices. The shifting of daily energy usage could potentially
cause a small increase in the mean and deviation of the internal home temperature,
which is a discomfort cost borne by the customer. In our approach, the LSE awards a
number of “Energy Coupons” to the customer in proportion to his usage at the non-
peak times, and these coupons are used as tickets for a lottery conducted by the LSE.
A higher number of coupons would be obtained by choosing an option that potentially
entails more discomfort, and would also imply a higher probability of winning at the
lottery. Since the customers do not observe the variation of day-ahead prices on a day-
to-day basis nor do they see the aggregate demand at the LSE, the lottery scheme
serves as a light-weight and easy to implement mechanism to transfer some of this
information over to the customers by coupling them. We will explicitly demonstrate
the advantage of this coupling over an individual incentive scheme (a fixed reward for
peak time reductions) that serves as a benchmark for the comparison.
In our analytical model, each agent has a set of actions that it can take in each play
of a repeated game, with each action having a corresponding cost. Higher cost actions
yield a higher number of coupons. Agents participate in a lottery in which they are
randomly permuted into groups, and one or more prizes are given in each group. The
state of each agent is measured using his surplus, which captures the history of plays
experienced by the agent, and is a proxy to capture his interest in participating in the
incentive system. A win at the lottery increases the surplus, and a loss decreases it.
Furthermore, we assume that the agent has a prospect incremental utility function
that is increasing and concave for positive surplus and convex for negative surplus.
This prospect theory model captures decision making under risk and uncertainty for
agents. Any agent could depart from the system with a fixed probability independent
of the others, and a departing agent is replaced by a new entrant with a randomly
drawn surplus. The main question we answer in this paper then is how would agents
decide on what action to take at each play? Having answered this we also comment on
impact of this on the sum total value of the agents, the return to the system and the
trade-off between these two quantities provided by our proposed scheme.
1.1. Prospect Theory
Most previous studies account for uncertainty in agent payoffs by means of expected
utility theory (EUT). Here, the objective of the decision maker is to maximize the proba-
bilistically weighted average utilities under different outcomes, and it is assumed that
he/she is capable of making arbitrarily complex deductions. However, EUT does not
incorporate observed behavior of human agents, who exhibit bounded rationality and
can take decisions deviating from the conventional rational agent norm. For example,
empirical studies have shown that agents ascribe high weights to rare, positive events
(such as winning a lottery) [Kahneman and Tversky 1979].
Prospect theory (PT) [Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992;
Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1984] is perhaps the most well-
known alternative theory to EUT. It was originally developed for binary lotteries [Kah-
neman and Tversky 1979] and later refined to deal with issues related to multiple out-
comes and valuations [Tversky and Kahneman 1992]. This Nobel-prize-in-economics-
winning theory has been observed to provide a more accurate description of decision
making under risk and uncertainty than EUT. There are three key characteristics
ACM Trans. Model. Perform. Eval. Comput. Syst., Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Mean Field Games in Nudge Systems for Societal Networks A:3
of PT. First, the value function is concave for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for
losses than for gains. This feature is due to the observation that most (human) decision
makers prefer avoiding losses to achieving gains. Thus, the value function is usually
S-shaped. Second, a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale is in effect, i.e.,
(human) decision makers will overweight low probability events and underweight high
probability events. The weighting function usually has an inverted S-shape, i.e., it is
steepest near endpoints and shallower in the middle of the range, which captures the
behaviors related to risk seeking and risk aversion. Finally the third, the framing ef-
fect is accounted for, i.e., the (human) decision maker takes into account the relative
gains or losses with respect to a reference point rather than the final asset position. As
PT fits better in reality than EUT based on many empirical studies, it has been widely
used in many contexts such as social sciences [Gao et al. 2010; Harrison and Rutstro¨m
2009], communication networks [Li and Mandayam 2012; Clark et al. 2002; Yu et al.
2014] and smart grids [Wang et al. 2014; Xiao et al. 2015]. Since we study equilibria
that arise through (human) agents’ repeated play in lotteries, we use PT as opposed to
EUT to account for agent-perceived value while taking decisions.
1.2. Mean Field Games
The problem described is an example of a dynamic Bayesian game with incomplete
information, wherein each player has to estimate the actions of all his potential op-
ponents in the current lottery (and in the future) without knowing their surpluses,
play a best response, and update his beliefs about their states of surplus based on
the outcome of the lottery. However, since the set of agents is large and, from the per-
spective of each agent, each lottery is conducted with a randomly drawn finite set of
opponents, an accurate approximation for any agent is to assume that the states of
his opponents (and hence actions) are independent of each other. This is the setting
of a Mean Field Game (MFG) [Lasry and Lions 2007; Jovanovic and Rosenthal 1988;
Huang et al. 2006], which we will use as a framework to study equilibria in societal
networks. Here, the system is viewed from the perspective of a single agent, who as-
sumes that each opponent’s action would be drawn independently from an assumed
distribution, and plays a best response action. We say that the system is at a Mean
Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this best response action turns out to be a sample drawn
from the assumed distribution.
1.3. Demand Response in Deregulated Markets
Demand Response is the term used to refer to the idea of customers being incentivized
in some manner to change their normal electricity usage patterns in response to peaks
in the wholesale price of electric power [Albadi and El-Saadany 2008]. Many methods
of achieving demand response exist, including an extreme one of turning off power for
short intervals to customers a few times a year if the price is very high. Customers
expect a subsidy in return, often in terms of a reduced electricity bill.
1.4. Main Results
Our objective in this paper is to design and analyze a system that can provide greater
ability for the LSE to realize a desired combination of profit and user value by incen-
tivizing user behavior. Our main contributions in this paper are as follows:
(1) We propose a mean field model to capture the dynamics in societal networks. Our
model is well suited to large scale systems in which any given subset of agents inter-
act only rarely. This kind of system satisfies a chaos hypothesis that enables us to use
the mean field approximation to accurately model agent interactions. The state of the
mean field agent is its surplus, and the agent must choose from a finite set of actions
based on its surplus and its belief about the action distribution of other agents. The
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state (surplus) evolves according to a Markov process that increases by winning and
decreases by losing at the lottery. Our mean field model of societal networks is quite
general, and can be applied to different incentive schemes that are currently being
proposed in the field of public transportation and communication network usage.
(2) We conduct a simulation analysis of our scheme under an accurate measurement-
based model of the daily usage of electricity in each hour in Texas. We also use the
data on wholesale electricity prices during the interval to calculate what times of day
would yield the best returns to rewards. We show that under several intuitive coupon
allocation options and a $15 weekly reward (lottery prize), customers would change
their AC setpoints (as small as 1◦C each day) and each week, the LSE gains a benefit
of the order of a $80 over a cluster of 50 homes. While doing so, we also numerically
verify that our model satisfies conditions needed for passage to the mean field.
(3) We conduct comparative studies between a benchmark scheme that returns a fixed
reward per action (assuming that each customer maximizes his return) versus the
lottery scheme, and show that the lottery scheme can outperform the fixed reward
scheme by about 100% in terms of total value to the users, and about 20% in terms
of profit to the LSE. We also explore the relation between LSE profit and user value
for both schemes, and show that as one changes the reward values and coupon alloca-
tions, the lottery scheme bounds the achievable region of the benchmark scheme in a
Pareto-sense: it is better able to attain a desired combination of user value and LSE
profit, and includes combinations unachievable by the individual incentive scheme.
(4) We develop a characterization of a lottery in which multiple rewards can be dis-
tributed, but with each participant getting at most one by withdrawing the winner in
each round. Each lottery is played amongst a cluster ofM agents drawn from a random
permutation of the set of all agents. While the exact form of the lottery is not critical
to our results, we present it for completeness.
(5) We characterize the best response policy of the mean field agent, using a dynamic
programming formulation. We find that under our assumptions, the value function
is continuous in the action distribution, but that multiple actions could turn out to
be best responses. Hence, an agent also needs to choose some randomization method
across such equal-value actions. If the value function is super-modular, sub-modular or
S-shaped (under the prospect-based utility function), the action choices map to surplus
intervals, with two actions being of equal value at each interval boundary.
(6) The probability of winning the lottery defines the transition kernel (along with
the regeneration distribution) of the Markov process of the surplus, and hence maps
an assumed distribution across competitors states to a resultant stationary distribu-
tion. We show the existence of a fixed point of this kernel, which is the MFE, by using
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Essentially, the system is a map between the space
consisting of the triple of an assumed action distribution, a randomized policy and a
surplus distribution back to itself, and our result is to show this map has a fixed point.
Our proof of the existence of MFE does not depend on the shape of the utility function,
which can be quite general. Since we have a discrete action and state space, showing
a fixed point in the space of such triples is quite intricate.
A 2-page conference abstract that includes a high-level overview of our results de-
veloped herein was presented to practitioners in [Li et al. 2015].
1.5. Related Work
In terms of the MFG, our framework is based on work such as [Iyer et al. 2014; Man-
jrekar et al. 2014; Li et al. 2016a]. In [Iyer et al. 2014] the setting is that of advertisers
bidding for spots on a webpage, and the focus is on learning the value of winning (mak-
ing a sale though the advertisement) as time proceeds. In [Manjrekar et al. 2014], apps
on smart phones bid for service from a cellular base station, and the goal is to ensure
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that the service regime that results has low per-packet delays. In both works, the ex-
istence of an MFE with desired properties is proved. In [Li et al. 2016a], the objective
is to incentivize truthful revelation of state that would allow for optimal resource al-
location in a device-to-device wireless network. The state space is discrete, and the
focus is on the exploration of truthful dynamic mechanisms in the mean field regime.
However, unlike that work, we focus on a lottery-based allocation in this paper. The
lottery is simple and well-established, and has been successfully applied in a variety of
existing nudge systems. Thus, our goal is to analyze this well-established mechanism,
rather than designing new ones. Also, unlike the previous work, all of which focussed
on pure strategy equilibria, our current work has a more complex state space and pure
strategy equilibria may not exist due to the non-uniqueness of best responses. Hence,
we seek a mixed strategy equilibrium, which necessitates a different proof technique.
Nudge systems are typically designed and used to encourage socially beneficial be-
haviors and individually beneficial behaviors. For instance, lottery schemes are widely
used in practice to incentivize good behavior, e.g., to combat (sales) tax evasion in
Brazil ([Naritomi 2013]), Portugal ([Poco et al. 2015]), Taiwan ([Chen and Wang 2010]),
and for Internet congestion management ([Loiseau et al. 2014]). Similarly, [Merugu
et al. 2009; Prabhakar 2013] provide experimental results on designing lottery-based
“nudge engines” to provide incentives to participants to modify their behaviors in the
context of evenly distributing load on public transportation. In another scheme, [All-
cott and Kessler 2015] study the impact of nudging on social welfare by sending one-
year home energy reports to participants and using multiple price lists to determine
participants’ willingness to stay in the system for the next year. Our system is a form
of nudge engine, but our focus is on analytical characterization of system behavior and
attained equilibria with large number of customers with repeated decision-making. We
aim to design incentive schemes to modify customer behavior such that the system as
the whole benefits from the attained equilibrium.
Our idea of offering coupons for reduced electricity usage at certain times is based
on one presented in [Zhong et al. 2013], which suggests offering incentives to coincide
with predicted realtime price peaks. An experimental trial based on a similar idea is
described in [Bitar 2015], in which the focus is on designing algorithms to coordinate
demand flexibility to enable the full utilization of variable renewable generation. In
[Hao and Xie 2014], this kind of system is modeled as a Stackelberg game with two
stages: setting the coupon values followed by consumer choice. The decision making
model in all the above research is myopic. The authors of [Schwartz et al. 2012] study
demand-response as trading off the cost of an action (such as modifying energy usage)
against the probability of winning at a lottery in terms of a mean field game. However,
the game is played in a single step according to their model, and there is no evolution
of state or dynamics based on repeated play. Further, their conception of the mean
field equilibrium is that the mean value of the action distribution (not the distribution
itself) is invariant. Unlike these models, we are interested in characterizing repeated
consumer choice with state evolution when the number of customers is large, and iden-
tifying the action distribution and benefits (if any) of the resulting equilibrium.
A rich literature studies lottery schemes, and here we can only hope to cover a frac-
tion of them that we see most relevant. In this paper, we model lotteries as choosing
a random permutation of the M agents participating in it, and picking the first K
of them as winners, with the distribution on the symmetric group of permutations of
{1, · · · ,M} being a function of the coupons assigned to the different actions. Assuming
that different actions yield different numbers of coupons, we will choose the distribu-
tion such that more coupons results in a higher probability of winning. There are var-
ious probabilistic models on permutations in the ranking literature [Qin et al. 2010;
Lozano and Irurozki 2012], Here we use the popular Plackett-Luce model [Hunter
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2004] to implement our lotteries. While the Plackett-Luce model is used for concrete-
ness, other probabilistic models on permutations such as the Thurstone model [Lozano
and Irurozki 2012] can also be used with the number of coupons as parameters of the
distribution as long as more coupons results in a higher probability of winning.
The monotonicity properties in rewards are shared with other literature, such as
[Gomes et al. 2010; Adlakha et al. 2015]. In particular, [Adlakha et al. 2015] focuses on
the existence of the mean field equilibrium when players welfare depends on the dis-
tribution of other players actions. However, this previous work studies the existence of
pure strategy equilibria, whereas our discrete state and action spaces requires consid-
eration of a mixed strategy equilibrium. The proof of the existence of this equilibrium
is one of the major technical contributions of this paper.
1.6. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our mean field model. We
then conduct simulation-based numerical studies in Section 3, on utilizing our frame-
work in the context of demand response in electricity markets. In Section 4 we develop
a characterization of a lottery in which multiple rewards can be distributed, but with
each participant getting at most one by withdrawing the winner in each round. We
discuss the basic property of the optimal value function in Section 5. The existence of
MFE is considered in Section 6. We characterize the best response policy of the mean
field agent, using a dynamic programming formulation in Section 7. We conclude in
Section 8. To ease exposition of our results, all proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. MEAN FIELD MODEL
We consider a general model of a societal network in which the number of agents is
large. Agents have a discrete set of actions available to them, and must take one of
these actions at each discrete time instant. The actions result in the agents receiv-
ing coupons, with higher cost actions resulting in more coupons. The agents are then
randomly permuted into clusters of size M, and a nudge is provided via a lottery that
is held using the coupons to win real rewards. Thus, agents must take their actions
under some belief about the likely actions, and hence the likely coupons held by their
competitors in the lottery.
Figure 1 illustrates the mean field approximation of our model. We provide justifica-
tion for the mean field approximation in the discussion at the end of this section. The
diagram is drawn from the perspective of a single agent (w.l.o.g, let this be agent 1),
who assumes that the actions played by each of his opponents would be drawn inde-
pendently of each other from the probability mass function ρ. In this section, we will
introduce the notation, costs and payoffs of the agent, and provide a brief description
of the policy space and equilibrium.
Fig. 1. Mean Field Game.
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Time: Time is discrete and indexed by k ∈ {0, 1, · · · }.
Agents: The total number of agents is infinite, and we consider a generic agent 1 who
in each lottery will be paired with M − 1 others drawn randomly.
Actions: We suppose that each agent has the same action space denoted as A =
{1, 2, · · · , |A|}. Hence, the action that this agent takes at time k is a[k] ∈ A. Under
the mean field assumption, the actions of the other agents would be drawn indepen-
dently from the p.m.f. ρ = [b1, b2, · · · , b|A|], where ba is the probability mass associated
with action a. We call ρ as the assumed action distribution.
Costs: Each action a ∈ A taken at time k has a corresponding cost θa. This cost is fixed
and represents the discomfort suffered by the agent in having to take that action.
Coupons: When agent takes an action a, it is awarded some fixed number of coupons
ra for playing that action. These coupons are then used by the agents as lottery tickets.
Lottery: We suppose that there are only K rewards for agents in one cluster, where K
is a fixed number less than M . The probability of winning is based on the number of
coupons that each agent possesses. We model each lottery as choosing a permutation
of the M agents participating in it, and picking the first K of them as winners. We
denote the winning probability as pρ,a and derive its explicit form in Section 4.
States: The agent keeps track of his history of wins and losses in the lotteries by
means of his net surplus at time k, denoted as x[k]. The value of surplus is the state of
the agent, and is updated in a Markovian fashion as follows:
x[k + 1] =
{
x[k] + w, if agent 1 wins the lottery,
x[k]− l, if agent 1 loses the lottery, (1)
where w and l is the impact of winning or losing on surplus. Effectively, the assumption
is that the agent expects to win at least an amount l at each lottery. Not receiving this
amount would decrease his surplus. Similarly, if the prize money at the lottery is w+ l,
the increase in surplus due to winning is w. Surplus values are discrete, and the set of
possible values is given by a countable X that ranges from (−∞,+∞).
Value function for prospect: The impact of surplus on the agent’s happiness is mod-
eled by an S-shaped incremental utility function u(x[k]), which is monotone increasing,
concave for a positive surplus and convex for a negative surplus. Moreover, the impact
of loss is usually larger than that of gain of the same absolute value. Note that we
implicitly assume that the reference for all agents is 0. Then following [Tversky and
Kahneman 1992], we use the following value function for prospect
u(x) =
{
u+(x) = xγ , x ≥ 0,
u−(x) = −ϕ(−x)γ , x < 0, (2)
where ϕ > 1 is the loss penalty parameter and 0 < γ < 1 is the risk aversion parameter.
A larger ϕmeans that the operator is more loss averse, while a smaller γ indicates that
the operator is more risk seeking. From empirical studies [Tversky and Kahneman
1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1984], realistic values are ϕ = 2.25 and γ = 0.88.
Weighting function for prospect: It has been observed empirically that people tend
to subjectively weight uncertain outcomes in real-life decision making [Prelec 1998]. In
the proposed game, this weighting factors capture the agent’s subjective evaluation on
the mixed strategy of its opponents. Thus, under PT, instead of objectively observing
the probability of winning the lottery pρ,a, each user perceives a weighted version of it,
φ(pρ,a). Here, φ(·) is a nonlinear transformation that maps the objective probability to a
subjective one, which is monotonic increasing in probability. It has been shown in many
PT studies that, people usually overweight low probability outcomes and underweight
high probability outcomes. Following [Prelec 1998], we use the weighting function
φ(p) = exp(−(− ln p)ξ), for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, (3)
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where ξ ∈ (0, 1] is the objective weight that characterizes the distortion between sub-
jective and objective probability. Note that under the extreme case of ξ = 1, (3) reduces
to the conventional EUT probability, i.e., φ(p) = p.
Regeneration: An agent may quit the system at any time, independent of others. This
event occurs with probability 1− β, where β ∈ (0, 1). When this happens, a new agent
takes the place of the old one, with a state drawn from a probability mass function Ψ.
Best Response Policy: The agent must choose an action at each time, including
staying with the status-quo/baseline as an action too. The green/light tiles in Fig-
ure 1 relate to the problem of the agent determining his best response policy. The
agent assumes that the actions taken by each of his M − 1 opponents are drawn
independently from probability mass function ρ. Given this assumption, the state of
his surplus is x and current utility is u(x), the agent must calculate the probabil-
ity of winning at the lottery pρ,a(x), if he were to take action a(x) ∈ A, incurring a
cost θa(x) and gaining ra(x) coupons. Since the agent must take this decision repeat-
edly, he must solve a dynamic program to determine his optimal policy. There could
be many best response actions, and we assume that the agent chooses a randomized
policy σ(x) , [σ1(x), σ2(x), · · · , σa(x), · · · , σ|A|(x)], in which σa(x) specifies the proba-
bility of playing action a when the agent’s surplus is x; in other words, we enlarge the
space to include mixed strategies as pure strategy equilibria may not exist. The action
taken by the agent is a random variable A ∼ σ(x). The details of the lottery and how
to calculate the probability of success are given in Section 4. The properties of the best
response policy are described in detail in Section 7.
Stationary Surplus Distribution: The assumed action distribution ρ, and the best-
response randomized policy σ(x) yield the state transition kernel of the Markov chain
corresponding to the surplus, via the probability of winning the lottery pρ,a(x). This is
illustrated by means of the blue/dark tiles in Figure 1. The transition kernel also is
influenced by the regeneration distribution Ψ. The stationary distribution of surplus
associated with the transition kernel is denoted as ζρ. This stationary distribution of
the single mean field agent is equivalent to the one-step empirical state distribution of
infinite agents who all take a (mixed-strategy) action, σ(x) when state is x, assuming
that the actions of their competitors would be drawn from ρ.
Mean Field Equilibrium: The triple of an assumed action distribution ρ, randomized
policy σ and stationary surplus distribution ζ gets mapped via mapping Π∗ into a triple
of action distribution ρ˜, best-response randomized policy σ˜ and a stationary surplus
distribution ζ˜ via the operations described above. A fixed point of the resulting map is
called an MFE. For a formal definition and the proof of existence see Section 6.
2.1. Discussion
Is the MFG a good approximation? Specifically, we need to first show that for any
agent, the assumption that the states of any finite subset of agents that it interacts
with are independent of it and each other as the number of agents becomes asymp-
totically large. Second, we need to show that when we repeat the game over time, the
empirical distribution of the agents’ states converges to a fixed point (mean field limit).
The first result is follows from an argument called propagation of chaos via con-
structing interaction sets defined in [Graham and Me´le´ard 1994], which characterize
the conditions under which any finite subset of the state of the agents are independent
of each other. Following a similar argument to [Iyer et al. 2014], we can show that af-
ter any finite number of lotteries (finite time), as the total number of agents becomes
large enough, the interaction sets of any finite collections of agents become disjoint
with high probability. Hence, the states of these agents become independent. Inspired
by [Iyer et al. 2014], the proof is divided into two parts: (i) first, we need to show that
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as the total number of agents JM (J is the number of lotteries) becomes large enough,
the probability that agent 1 interacted with the set of agents (that it interacts at the
k-th lottery, k ≥ 1) before the k-th lottery become zero; and (ii) the action distribution
ρ1, the randomized policy σ1, and the surplus distribution ζ1 of agent 1 converges to the
assumed distributions ρ, σ, ζ, respectively, as the number of agents JM becomes large
enough. We do not present the full argument here due to space limitations and the fact
that it follows via identical arguments to [Graham and Me´le´ard 1994; Iyer et al. 2014].
The second result requires the establishment of the so called Mckean-Vlasov limit—
a differential equation that specifies the evolution of the empirical distribution of state
over the transition kernel specified in Figure 1. In order to do this, we need to verify
three sufficiency conditions presented in [Borkar and Sundaresan 2013]) (see Section
2 AssumptionsA1 -A3) built on a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC). It is easy to
move our discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) setup to their framework by equipping
each agent with an independent Poisson clock with rate λQ (chosen as 1 w.l.o.g). An
agent whose clock ticks is allowed to take an action, and receives a reward with the
same probability engendered by a lottery under the same action and with the same
belief distribution. The equivalence of the stationary distributions of the CTMC and
DTMC versions follows immediately from [Ross 2013] (Chapter 7), with the Bellman
equation of the DTMC system being replaced by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion of the CTMC. In our problem, the Q-matrix of the equivalent CTMC is simply
−λQI + λQP, where P is the P-matrix of the DTMC version and I is the identity ma-
trix. The most important condition of [Borkar and Sundaresan 2013] that needs to
be verified is the assumption on the Lipschitz nature of the map between the belief
action distribution and the resultant action distribution. We numerically verify in Sec-
tion 3.6.2 that given an action belief ρ, the derivative of this map at each iteration step
is bounded, leading to the desired Lipschitz property for both DTMC and CTMC. While
this supports the conjecture that the condition holds in our case, the proof is beyond
the scope of this work due to the implicit form of the map.
3. NUMERICAL STUDY
We conduct an empirical data-based simulation in the context of electricity usage for
home air conditioning to illustrate the likely performance of our nudge system in the
context of electricity demand-response. In doing so, we will also numerically study the
properties of the mean field approximation. As mentioned in Section 1, our context
is that of a Load Serving Entity (LSE) trying to incentivize its customers to shape
their electricity consumption so as to reduce its cost of electricity purchase from the
wholesale market whose price variation is as shown in Figure 2. These incentives could
increase the net surplus of the end-users, the profit of the LSE, or the total welfare of
these agents as well. Data available for our simulations consist of historical electricity
prices from [ERCOT 2014], and a data set containing appliance-wise electricity usage
for about 1000 homes along with the ambient temperatures over each day in June–
August, 2013 [Pecan-Street 2014].
3.1. Home Model
A standard continuous time model [Callaway 2009; Hao et al. 2015] for describing the
evolution of the internal temperature τ(t) at time t of an air conditioned home is
τ˙(t) =

− 1
RC
(τ(t)− τa)− η
C
Pm, if q(t) = 1,
− 1
RC
(τ(t)− τa), if q(t) = 0.
(4)
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Here, τa is the ambient temperature (of the external environment), R is the thermal
resistance of the home, C is the thermal capacitance of the home, η is the efficiency,
and Pm is the rated electrical power of the AC unit. The state of the AC is described
by the binary signal q(t), where q(t) = 1 means AC is in the ON state at time t and
in the OFF state if q(t) = 0. The state is determined by the crossings of user specified
temperature thresholds as follows:
lim
→0
q(t+ ) =

q(t), |τ(t)− τr| ≤ ∆,
1, τ(t) > τr + ∆,
0, τ(t) < τr −∆,
(5)
where τr is the temperature setpoint and ∆ is the temperature deadband.
Table I. Parameters for a Residential AC Unit
C(Capacitance) R(Resistance) Pm(Power) η(Coefficient) τr(Setpoint) ∆(Deadband)
10 kWh/◦C 2 ◦C/kW 6.8 kW 2.5 22.5 ◦C 0.3 ◦C
A number of studies investigate the thermal properties of typical homes. We use the
parameters shown in Table I for our simulations. These are based on the derivations
presented in [Callaway 2009] for temperature conditioning a 250 m2 home (about 2700
square feet), which is a common mid-size home in many Texas neighborhoods.
In order to determine the energy usage for AC in our typical home, we need to know
how the ambient temperature varies in Texas during the summer months of interest.
These values are available in the Pecan Street data set, and we plot the values of 3
days which are arbitrarily chosen over three months for Austin, TX in Figure 3.
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Fig. 4. Simulated ON/OFF
state of AC over a 24 hour
period in a home and the corre-
sponding interior temperature.
The interior temperature falls
when the AC comes on, and
rises when it is off.
Next, we calculate the ON-OFF pattern of our typical air conditioner based on the
ambient temperature variation over the course of the day. We do this by simulating
the controller in (5) with the appropriate ambient temperature values taken from Fig-
ure 3. The pattern is presented in Figure 4. We see that there is higher energy usage
during the hotter times of the day, as is to be expected. This also corresponds to the
peak in wholesale electricity prices shown for the same period in Figure 2. The total
energy used each day corresponding to our 2500 sq ft home with a 5 ton AC (= 6.8 kW;
see Table I) is 32.83 kWh. For comparison, we identified 4 homes in the Pecan Street
data set that have parameters in the same ballpark as our typical (simulated) home.
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The average size of these real homes was 2627 sq feet, with a 4 ton AC on average,
and the average electricity consumed for airconditioning was 34.8 kWh per day during
time interval corresponding to our simulation. The numbers are quite similar to our
simulated home, indicating accuracy of the model.
3.2. Actions, Costs and LSE Savings
Since we are interested in peak-period usage, we consider an action set available to
the customer that consists of choosing different thermostat setpoints during each hour
from 2−8 PM, i.e, 6 periods (hours) in total. We denote each period by an index j,where
j = 1 indicates the period 2 − 3 PM and so on until j = 6, which indicates the period
7 − 8 PM. Each action can now be identified with a vector (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6), where
yj indicates the setpoint in the period j. We take the setpoint 22.5◦C as the baseline.
Hence, the vector (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) indicates a baseline action in which
the customer does not change the original setpoint in each period. The set of all such
setpoint vectors defines an action set A, and we define the action with index a = 0 to be
the no-change action. Since the setpoints on a thermostat are discrete, the number of
actions is finite. We identified 5 other actions that appeared to have the most promise
of being used. These actions are shown in the second column of Table II.
We next calculate the cost of taking each action a ∈ A, which corresponds to the dis-
comfort of having a potentially higher mean and standard deviation in the home tem-
perature, and possibly higher energy consumption. We measure the state of the home
under action a ∈ A by the tuple consisting of the mean temperature, the standard de-
viation and energy usage, denoted [τ¯a, σa,Ea]. The baseline state of these parameters
is under action 0, denoted by [τ¯0, σ0,E0] We define the cost of taking any action a as
θa = |τ¯0 − τ¯a|+ λ|σ0 − σa| − ς(E0 − Ea), (6)
where we choose λ = 10 to make the numerical values of the mean and standard de-
viation comparable to each other and ς = 10 ¢/kWh as the fixed energy price. We note
that the map between temperature variation, discomfort suffered, and its measure-
ment in cents is not obvious. However, given the fact that the customer uses between
1− 3 kWh or about ¢10− 30 per hour to obtain a temperature differential between the
ambient temperature and interior temperature of about 15− 20◦C, the discomfort cost
of a degree C temperature increase being ¢1 seems reasonable in the limited tempera-
ture range that we are interested in. Note that the calculation of cost for each action
involves simulating the home under that action to determine [τ¯a, σa,Ea]. However, this
has to be done only once to create a look-up table, which can be used thereafter. Note
also that each action in A is chosen to be close to energy neutral, i.e., the third term
in (6) is essentially zero. Thus, we focus on modifying usage time, not the total usage.
Table II shows our selection of actions and their corresponding costs.
When applied over a day, each action could result in some savings to the LSE to-
wards the costs it incurs in purchasing electricity. We measure the day-ahead price of
electricity experienced by the LSE in dollars/MWh and denote the price at time period
j in day i as pii,j , where i = {1, 2, · · · , 92} and j = {1, · · · , 6}. Each action vector of a
customer would impose a net price on the LSE in proportion to the usage. We define
the differential price measured in dollars imposed by an action y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6)
versus z = (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6) as
H(y, z) =
∑
j
(k(yi,j)− k(zi,j))pii,j , (7)
where k converts the setpoints into electricity usage in each period, which is measured
in MWh. Setting y as the baseline action (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) presents a way
of measuring the reduction/increase in cost due to the incentive scheme.
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We calculated the savings of each action applied over each day of our three month
data set and obtained the average savings. These values are shown in Table II (where
the final columns entitled “C0–C3” will be discussed in Section 3.4). As is clear, the
cost of taking each of our selected actions is considerably lower than the savings re-
sulting from that action, and hence it might be possible to create appropriate incentive
schemes to encourage their adoption. We will consider two such schemes, namely, (i) a
fixed reward scheme used as a benchmark, and (ii) a lottery based scheme.
Table II. Actions, Costs, LSE Savings and Coupons Awarded
Index Action Vector Cost (¢) LSE C0 C1 C2 C3
Savings (¢)
0 (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) 0 0 37.4 8.416 8.416 8.416
1 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.75, 21.25) 3.68 27.7 715 431.8 521.8 611.8
2 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.25, 22.25) 3.15 22.7 693 431.8 511.6 591.5
3 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23, 22.5) 2.68 22 577 431.8 466.8 501.7
4 (22, 22, 22.25, 23, 23, 22.5) 1.34 19 434 287.4 325.6 363.7
5 (22, 22, 22.25, 23.25, 22.5, 22.75) 0.95 16.4 222 287.4 244.2 200.9
3.3. Benchmark Incentive Scheme
A simple incentive scheme to get users to adopt cost saving actions (from the LSE’s
perspective) is to calculate the expected savings of each action, and to deterministically
reward each agent with some percentage of the expected savings for taking that action.
Such guaranteed savings are similar in spirit to rebate for using public transportation
during off-peak hours, and a system of sharing a fraction of the savings by demand-
response providers such as OhmConnect [OhmConnect 2015]. We will use this scheme
as a benchmark in order to determine whether shared savings are large enough to
encourage meaningful participation. Thus, our benchmark incentive scheme attempts
to incentivize each action by returning to the user some fixed fraction of the expected
LSE savings for that action presented in Table II. For example, a return of 50% for
taking action 1 would imply awarding ¢13.85 each time that action is taken.
3.4. Lottery-Based Incentive Scheme
Our second incentive scheme is lottery-based, with Energy Coupons being used as
lottery tickets. Now, the baseline action a = 0 corresponds to a setpoint of 22.5◦C in
period 3 at which pii,3 is highest (Figure 2) for any day i. Hence, the LSE should in-
centivize actions that are likely to reduce the risks of peak day-ahead price by offering
Energy Coupons in proportion to the usage during the corresponding periods. In the
context of our simulation, it is intuitively clear that coupons must be placed at periods
of lower price. Our candidate coupon profiles are shown in Table III, where coupons
are awarded in periods 1 and 6 only if the usage is greater than base usage values
of x1 = 2.464 kWh and x6 = 2.24 kWh, respectively. We experimented with a range of
coupon profiles to explore their impact on the MFE, and present some examples C0–C3.
Table III. Mean Day-ahead Price and Energy Coupon Profiles
Index Period Price/MWh C0/kWh C1/kWh C2/kWh C3/kWh
1 2− 3 PM $47 107 100 100 100
2 3− 4 PM $55 5.4 0 0 0
3 4− 5 PM $78 1.8 0 0 0
4 5− 6 PM $99.6 0 0 0 0
5 6− 7 PM $66.5 3.6 0 0 0
6 7− 8 PM $49.5 54 0 20 40
Given the coupon placement by the LSE, the customers need to determine the num-
ber of coupons resulting from each action, and use these values to estimate the utility
that they would attain. Our six actions are shown in Table II with their attendant
costs and number of coupons received. The LSE conducts an lottery each week across
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clusters of M = 50 homes participating in each lottery. For each cluster, there is K = 1
prize for winning the lottery. We assume that the customers choose the same action on
each day of the week, and then participate in the lottery.
3.5. Utility and Surplus
As described in Section 2, the user state consists of his/her surplus. Any rewards result
in an increase in surplus by the reward amount w, whereas performing an action but
not receiving a reward results in decreasing the surplus by some amount l. Since a
reward is assured for each action in the benchmark incentive scheme, there are no
surplus decrease events. However, in the lottery scheme, a user that does not win the
lottery would see a decrease in surplus. We select l that results from losing at a lottery
to be the average reward obtained form the lottery assuming that every player has an
equal probability of winning.
For the customer utility, which maps surplus to utility units, we use the value func-
tion of prospect model (defined in (2)), u(x) = xγ if x ≥ 0 or u(x) = −ϕ(−x)γ if x < 0,
where ϕ = 2.25 and γ = 0.88 according to the empirical studies conducted in [Tversky
and Kahneman 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1984]. The utility model applies to both
the benchmark and the lottery scheme. Under this model, we expect a user who has
lost a number of lotteries to stop participating in the system, since his surplus becomes
negative and he is not receiving enough of an incentive to stay, given the cost he bears
each day. Similarly, a user who has won too many times would have a large surplus,
and would also not be keen on participating since the marginal utility he gets may
not be high enough for him. The latter observation applies to the benchmark as well,
although given the small rewards, we do not expect it to happen frequently.
The participants in the lottery scheme see a distorted probability of winning, pa-
rameterized by ξ, as defined in (3). This is an important feature of our model, since it
captures the attractiveness of lotteries in incentivizing risky actions. Consistent with
empirical studies in [Prelec 1998], we choose ξ = 0.37.
We assume that a customer remains in the system with probability 0.92, i.e., the
average lifetime is 12 time steps, which parallels the fact that the main summer season
lasts for about three months. Further, a newly entering customer has zero surplus.
3.6. Equilibria Attained by Incentive Schemes
3.6.1. Benchmark Scheme. As described in Section 3.3, we construct a fixed-reward
type of incentive scheme to obtain a benchmark with which to compare the perfor-
mance of the lottery scheme. Under the benchmark scheme, customers are awarded
some percentage of the expected savings that their action is likely to yield to the LSE,
shown in Table II. The actual action chosen by the customer will be determined using
a dynamic program (DP) similar to the one defined in (14). However, since rewards are
deterministic, there is no dependence on the belief over competitors’ actions, and the
only randomness is from the lifetime of the user. Thus, solving the DP is straightfor-
ward, and we can easily obtain a map between surplus and action for a given reward.
3.6.2. Lottery Scheme. We next consider the lottery with M = 50 competitors. The win
probability pρ,a is the probability that the coupons generated by action a are greater
than those generated by M − 1 independent actions drawn from ρ. We offer a single
prize with value $15, which implies that the customer expects to win ¢30 on average by
participating, i.e., the decrease in surplus due to losing at the lottery is l = 0.3, while
the increase in surplus due to winning is w = 15− 0.3 = 14.7.
We start with a uniform action distribution ρ0 as the initial condition. In each it-
eration i, given the belief ρi (action distribution of other players), we first determine
the value of each state using the Bellman equation for value (15), with convergence
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in roughly 50 steps. We next determine the stationary surplus distribution, and then
map it to the resultant stationary action distribution ρi+1, uniformly choosing all equal
value actions. Note that this map Π˜, from belief ρi to the resultant distribution ρi+1, is
a sequential version of the map Π∗ from Section 2, and Π˜ and Π∗ have the same fixed
points. As described in Section 2.1, the iterative procedure is referred to as the Mckean-
Vlasov dynamics. As discussed in Section 2.1, we also identify the CTMC version of our
system, and simulate it using the same procedure above. Finally, as specified in Sec-
tion 2.1, an important sufficiency condition for convergence is the Lipschitzness of the
map Π˜. We calculate a numerical derivative (for both the DTMC and CTMC versions)
||Π˜i+1(ρi+1)− Π˜i(ρi)||sup
||ρi+1 − ρi||sup . (8)
Figure 5 (Left) plots the derivative along a simulated trajectory for both DTMC and
CTMC. That they are bounded, indicates the Lipschitz property of the maps.
We found that typically convergence occurs rapidly and reaches within 0.1% of the
final value within 20 iterations. The eventual values to which each surplus value con-
verge is the mean field surplus distribution, in which it turns out that customers win at
a lottery at most once over an average lifetime of 12 time intervals, as is to be expected
with a cluster size of 50 customers at each lottery. The mean field action distribution
under the lottery scheme with a $15 reward and the savings attained are shown in
Table IV. The MFE shifts based on the coupon profile, but the saving is quite robust to
profiles that award comparable numbers of coupons in periods 1 and 6.
We observed multiple thresholds at which two actions have identical value. For ex-
ample, under coupon profile C0, there are three threshold surplus values −19.2, 1.7
and 190.3 at which we have equal probabilities of choosing between actions 0 and 2,
between 2 and 4, and between 4 and 5, respectively.
Table IV. Mean Field Equilibria under $15 reward (lottery prize)
Coupon Profile MFE Expected Surplus Expected Value LSE Saving
C0 [0.001, 0, 0.81, 0, 0.19, 0] 0.3563 $189.8 $77
C1 [0.001, 0, 0, 0.584, 0, 0.416] 0.3704 $203.5 $69
C2 [0.001, 0, 0.875, 0.124, 0, 0] 0.3565 $193.1 $79
C3 [0.001, 0, 0.999, 0, 0, 0] 0.3563 $189.4 $79.4
Example. Figure 5 (Middle) shows the interior temperature under actions 0, 2, 4, the
mean field action distribution and benchmark action when $15 is the total reward
amount. We see that the mean field behavior is more aggressive than the benchmark
in reducing the interior temperature before the peak period, and shows a marginally
higher interior temperature during the peak period. Figure 5 (Right) shows the com-
parison of energy consumption between action 0 (doing nothing, with an average en-
ergy consumption of 36.5 kWh per day), the mean field action distribution (average
energy consumption of 36.7 kWh per day), and the benchmark action (average energy
consumption of 36.4 kWh per day). We see that the mean field distribution is more ag-
gressive in moving energy usage away from the peak period as compared to the bench-
mark, although both have essentially the same energy consumption and an identical
reward value of $15 per week. Finally, we compute that the savings to the LSE over 50
homes each week in this is example is $57.4 in the benchmark scheme and $77 in the
lottery scheme. Thus, incentivizing customers by offering a prize of $15 each week is
certainly feasible. The MFE illustrates that even as small as 1◦C change of the setpoint
of AC each day over several homes can yield significant benefits.
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Fig. 5. (Left) Numerical derivative of map; (Middle) Simulated ON/OFF state of AC over a 24 hour period
under actions 0, 2, 4, the mean field action and the benchmark action on an arbitrary day and the corre-
sponding interior temperature. The temperature graph is slightly offset for actions 2, 4, the mean field action
and the benchmark action for ease of visualization; (Right) Average daily energy usage profile.
3.7. Performance Analysis of Incentive Schemes
Benchmark Scheme. We consider a range of scenarios wherein the LSE rewards cus-
tomers for each action with between 1% − 100% of its expected savings, in steps of 1%
increments. The relations between the total weekly reward to customers, savings to
the LSE and profit to the LSE, are shown in Figure 6 (Left). We see that the maximum
weekly profit of $52 is achieved when about 9% savings (about $10 in total per week)
is the customer reward regardless of the coupon awarding profile, indicating robust-
ness to the exact profile employed. Note that although the reward under the bench-
mark scheme is indicated by a percentage returned, it corresponds to a dollar value
returned based on the actions of the customers, and the total dollar reward values are
also shown in green (dashed line) in Figure 6 (Left).
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profit 3 saving 3
profit 2 saving 2
profit 1 saving 1
profit 0 saving 0
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Fig. 6. The relation between offered reward, LSE savings and LSE profit: (Left) Benchmark incentive
scheme and (Middle) Lottery scheme; (Right) The relation between profit to the LSE and the expected value
of a generic customer when different rewards are given to the customers.
Lottery Scheme. We next conduct numerical experiments under a range coupon pro-
files and lottery rewards from $5 to $95 in steps of $5 increments as we did (by using
percentage returns) with the benchmark scheme. Hence, we set a reward value, calcu-
late the values of l and w that it implies, and compute the MFE for different coupon
awarding profiles. Our results are shown in Figure 6 (Middle), where we plot the total
savings to the LSE as well as its profit (savings minus reward) as a function of the
reward offered for winning the lottery. From Figure 6 (Middle), the maximum profit
is achieved by in a robust manner giving a reward of $15 − $20 for all coupon profiles
Also, from observation of the mean field action distribution that results from this re-
ward (Table IV), we note that almost all the customers will participate in the system,
i.e., the probability of choosing action 0 is close 0.
From Figures 6 (Left) and 6 (Middle), we see that the maximum profit using the
lottery scheme is a little over $62 per week, while the maximum profit is only about $52
under the benchmark scheme. Given that a typical LSE has several hundred thousand
customers, a difference of $10 each week over a cluster of 50 homes is quite significant.
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Comparison of Local Social Welfare. Our final step is to characterize the local social wel-
fare under the lottery (under different coupon profiles) and the benchmark. We define
the (expected) local social welfare (LSW) measured in dollars/week as
LSW = 50EMFE[Vi(X)] + profits of the LSE. (9)
For the lottery scheme, the maximum expected value to each user of roughly 600
each is obtained when the LSE is revenue neutral. This is roughly 100% better than
what can be achieved with the benchmark individual incentive. This increase is due to
both the prospect-based utility as well as coupling across users in the lottery scheme.
Note also that the LSE obtains a maximum profit between $62− $64.4 (for different
coupon profiles) by giving a $15 reward, under which each customer will take actions
according to the MFEs shown in Table IV. The corresponding surplus is also shown,
which for a generic customer is between $189.2 − $203.5. Therefore, the local social
welfare is about $9552.
For the benchmark, the profit to the LSE is $42 when $15 reward is given as shown in
Figure 6 (Left), under which each customer will only take action 5. The corresponding
expected value of a generic customer is about $56.2, and the local social welfare is about
$2852. Again, we see that the lottery scheme outperforms the benchmark.
We perform the same analysis to determine the relation between profit to the LSE
and the expected value of a generic customer under different rewards and coupon pro-
files. Our results are shown in Figure 6 (Right). We explore a range of rewards from $5
to the break-even point ($80 for lottery scheme and $95 for the benchmark, regardless
of the coupons awarded). The points on each curve correspond to increasing the reward
by $5 in steps in a manner indicated by the arrow marks. From Figure 6 (Right), we see
that the lottery scheme appears to better capture the frontier between LSE profit and
customer value than the benchmark scheme, with the lottery-based incentive being
better in a Pareto-sense. This is true regardless of the exact maximum coupon choice.
Thus, based on a desired level of customer value and LSE profit, the lottery scheme
can ensure a better outcome than the benchmark scheme with an appropriate reward.
4. LOTTERY SCHEME
We first construct the lottery scheme that will be used in our mean field game. We
permute all the agents into clusters, such that there are exactly M agents in each
cluster, and conduct a lottery in each such cluster. Suppose there are K rewards for
all agents in one cluster, where K is a fixed number less than M . When an agent
takes an action, he/she will receive the credit (number of coupons) associated with that
action. Then the probability of winning is based on the number of coupons that each
agent possesses. We will model the lotteries as choosing a permutation of the M agents
participating in it, and picking the first K of them as winners. Then different lottery
schemes can be interpreted as choosing different distributions on the symmetric group
of permutations on M . In particular, we will use ideas from the Plackett-Luce model
to implement our lotteries.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the actions are ordered in decreasing
order of the costs so that θ1 ≥ · · · ≥ θA. In order to incentivize agents to take the more
costly actions we will insist that the vector of coupons obtained for each action is also
in decreasing order of the index, i.e., r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rA.
The specific lottery procedure we consider is the following: for every agent m that
takes action a[m] and receives coupons ra[m] > 0, we choose an exponential random
variable with mean 1/ra[m] and then pick the first K agents in increasing order of the
realizations of the exponentials. Note the abuse of notation only in this section to use
a[m] to refer to the action of agent m. Since we consider only one lottery, we do not
consider time k. Let the agent m = 1, . . . ,M receive ra[m] number of coupons. The set
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of winners is a permutation over the agent indices, and we denote such a permutation
by µ = [µ1, µ2, · · · , µM ]. We then have the probability of the permutation µ given by
P(µ|ra[1], . . . , ra[M ]) =
M−1∏
n=1
ra[µn]∑M
j=n ra[µj ]
. (10)
Essentially, after each agent is chosen as a winner, he is removed and the next lottery
is conducted just as before but with fewer agents.
We now analyze the probability of winning in our lottery. For analysis under the
mean field assumption, it suffices to consider agent 1 with the coupons it gets by taking
action a being denoted as ra[1]. Let M := {2, . . . ,M}, which is the set of opponents of
agent 1. For these agents, suppose there are υn agents that choose action n, where∑
n∈A υn = M − 1. We denote the vector of these actions by ~υ = (υ1, . . . , υA).
The conditional probability of agent 1 failing to obtain a reward is given by
pL1,~υ =
∑
κ1∈M1
· · ·
∑
κK∈MK
∏K
l=1 ra[κl]∏K
l=1(ra[1] +
∑
m∈Ml ra[m])
,
where L refers to the fact that agent 1 “loses,”M1 = M, and for l ≥ 2 we haveMl =
Ml−1\{κl−1}. Essentially, the above looks at the lottery process round by round, and is
a summation of the probabilities of all permutations in which agent 1 does not appear
in the first spot in any round.
The above expression considerably simplifies if the summations are instead taken
over the actions κ˜l that the lottery winner κl at round l ∈ {1, . . . ,K} can take. Note that
we assume that we can distinguish the actions based on the number of coupons given
out. If this were not true, then we could further simplify the expression by summing
over the coupon space. Given a coupon/action profile ~υ, let J (~υ) denote the actions
that have non-zero entries. Additionally, by ~υ − ~1κ˜ for κ˜ ∈ J (~υ) denote the resulting
coupon profile obtained by removing one entry at location κ˜, and by r~υ the sum of all
the coupons in profile ~υ, i.e.,
∑
κ˜∈J (~υ) rκ˜υκ˜. Then
pL1,~υ =
∑
κ˜1∈J (~υ1)
· · ·
∑
κ˜K∈J (~υK)
∏K
l=1 υ
l
κ˜l
rκ˜l∏K
l=1(ra[1] + r~υl)
, (11)
where ~υ1 = ~υ, for l = 2, . . . ,K, ~υl = ~υl−1 − ~1κ˜l and υlκ˜ is the number of entries at
location κ˜ for coupon profile ~υl. Note that pL1,~υ is a decreasing function of ra[1] for every
~υ. Therefore, agent 1 comparing two actions i and j that have r1,i > r1,j will find
pL1,~υ(i) < p
L
1,~υ(j) for all ~υ. Also by taking the limit of ra[1] going to 0, having an action
with 0 coupons results in a loss probability of 1 for every ~υ.
To determine the probability of winning in the lottery we need to account for the fact
that the actions of the opponents are drawn from the distribution ρ (under the mean
field assumption). Hence, the probability of obtaining the coupon profile (equivalently
action profile) of the opponents ~υ = (υ1, . . . , υA) is given by the multinomial formula,
i.e.,
Pρ(~υ) =
(M − 1)!∏i∈A bυii∏
i∈A υi!
. (12)
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Using (11) and (12), we obtain the winning probability for the mean field agent 1
when taking action a as
pρ,a = 1−
∑
~υ:|J (~υ)|=M−1
pL1,~υPρ(~υ). (13)
By lower bounding each term in the conditional probability of not obtaining a reward
we get pρ,a ≤ 1 − M−KM ( rAr1 )K =: pW ∈ (0, 1). If we ran the lottery without removing
the winners (and any of their coupons), we obtain a lower bound on the probability of
winning that has a simpler expression. Using this simpler expression we can obtain
the lower bound pρ,1 ≥ 1− (1− rArA+(M−1)r1 )K =: pW ∈ (0, 1). Note that both bounds are
independent of ρ. If we allow an action that yields 0 coupons, then the above bounds
become trivial with pW = 1 and pW = 0.
An important feature of our lottery scheme is that the probability of winning in-
creases with the number of coupons given out. For simplicity we assumed a fixed re-
ward for any win. However, we can extend the lotteries to ones where different rewards
are given out at different stages, and also where the rewards are dependent on the
number of coupons of the winner. For the latter, we will insist on the rewards being an
increasing function of the number of coupons of the winner. Finally, we can also extend
to scenarios where we choose the number of stages K in an (exogenous) random fash-
ion in {1, . . . ,M − 1}. Since the analysis carries through unchanged except with more
onerous notation, we only discuss the simplest setting.
5. OPTIMAL VALUE FUNCTION
As discussed in Section 2, the mean field agent must determine the optimal action to
take, given his surplus x and the assumed action distribution ρ. We follow the usual
quasi-linear combination of prospect function and cost consistent with Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions, and under which the impact of winning or losing in the
lottery is on the surplus of the agent (and not simply a one-step myopic value change).
The objective of a particular agent i is
Vρ(x[k]) = max{a(x[l])∈A|A|}∞
l=k
E
{ ∞∑
l=k
βl−k
(
ui(xi[l])− θai(xi[l])
)}
,
where x[k] = (x1[k], · · · , xM [k]), and a(x[k]) = (a1(x1[k]), · · · , aM (xM [k])) are the vec-
tors of surplus and actions for each agent in the particular lottery cluster of the agent
at time k, respectively. The expectation is over the distribution of competitors actions
and the randomness introduced by the lottery.
Under the mean field assumption, the actions of all agents besides i are drawn from
a distribution ρ independently of each other. Also, the agent uses a prospect function
to estimate the probabilities of winning and losing at the lottery. We can then drop the
index of the agent i and the dynamic program that the agent in prospect theory needs
to solve is given by the following Bellman equation
Vρ(x) = max
a(x)∈A
{u(x)− θa(x) + β[φ(pρ,a(x))Vρ(x+ w) + φ(1− pρ,a(x))Vρ(x− l)]}. (14)
Note that pρ,a(x) is a result of a lottery that we described in detail in Section 4, and
φ(·) is the weighting function, which overweights small probabilities (of winning the
lottery) and underweights moderate and high probabilities (of losing the lottery). Here,
we use the weighting function defined in (3).
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First, we need to define a set of functions as
Φ =
{
f : X→ R : sup
x∈X
∣∣∣∣ f(x)Ω(x)
∣∣∣∣ <∞} ,
where Ω(x) = max{|u(x)|, 1}. Note that Φ is a Banach space with Ω−norm,
||f ||Ω = sup
x∈X
∣∣∣∣ f(x)Ω(x)
∣∣∣∣ <∞.
Also define the Bellman operator Tρ as
Tρf(x) = max
a(x)∈A
{u(x)− θa(x) + β[φ(pρ,a(x))f(x+ w) + φ(1− pρ,a(x))f(x− l)]}, (15)
where f ∈ Φ.
We now show that the optimal value function Vρ(x) exists and it is continuous in ρ.
LEMMA 5.1. 1) There exists a unique f∗ ∈ Φ, such that Tρf∗(x) = f∗(x) for every
x ∈ X, and given x ∈ X, for every f ∈ Φ, we have Tnρ f(x)→ f∗(x), as n→∞.
2) The fixed point f∗ of operator Tρ is the unique solution of Equation (14), i.e. f∗ = V ∗ρ .
LEMMA 5.2. The value function Vρ(·) is Lipschitz continuous in ρ.
5.1. Stationary distributions
For a generic agent, w.l.o.g., say agent 1, we consider the state process {x1[k]}∞k=0.
It’s a Markov chain with countable state-space X, and it has an invariant transition
kernel given by a combination of the randomized policy σ(x) at each surplus x for any
a(x) ∈ A, and the lottery scheme from Section 4. By following this Markov policy, we
get a process {W [k]}∞k=0 that takes values in {win, lose} with probability pρ,a(x) for
the win, drawn conditionally independent of the past (given x1[k]). Then the transition
kernel conditioned on W [k] is given by
P(x1[k] ∈ B|x1[k − 1] = x,W [k]) = β1{x+w1{W [k]=win}−l1{W [k]=lose}∈B} + (1− β)Ψ(B), (16)
where B ⊂ X and Ψ is the probability measure of the regeneration process for surplus.
The unconditioned transition kernel is then
P(x1[k] ∈ B|x1[k − 1] = x) =β
∑
a(x)∈A
σa(x)pρ,a(x)1x+w∈B (17)
+ β
(
1−
∑
a(x)∈A
σa(x)pρ,a(x)
)
1x−l∈B + (1− β)Ψ(B).
LEMMA 5.3. The Markov chain where the action policy is determined by σ(x) based
on the states of the users and the transition probabilities in (17) is positive recurrent
and has a unique stationary surplus distribution. We denote the unique stationary sur-
plus distribution as ζρ×σ. Let ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x) be the surplus distribution at time k induced
by the transition kernel (17) conditioned on the event that X[0] = x and there is no
regeneration until time k. ζρ×σ(·) and ζ(k)ρ×σ(·) are related as follows:
ζρ×σ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βk
∫
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x)dΨ(x). (18)
Thus ζρ×σ(B) in terms of ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x) is simply based on the properties of the conditional
expectation. And note that in EΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)
)
, the random variable X is the initial
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condition of the surplus, distributed as Ψ. For x ∈ X, the only possible one-step updates
are the increase of the surplus to x+ w or a decrease to x− l, i.e. B = {x+ w, x− l}.
6. MEAN FIELD EQUILIBRIUM
The action distribution ρ is a probability mass function on the action set A: let bi be
the probability of choosing action i. Note that ρ lives in the probability simplex on
R|A|, which is compact and convex; denote it as Γρ. Let ζ be the stationary surplus
distribution and the set of all such possible surplus distributions is denoted as Γζ ,
which is a compact and convex subset of l∞: all surplus distributions are dominated
by the distribution obtained by allowing the agent to win in every period; all surplus
distributions dominate the distribution obtained by allowing the agent to lose in every
period; both these distributions have a finite mean (and convexity follows); and then
the compactness result follows using the argument in [Li et al. 2016b]. For a given
surplus x, let σ(x) be the action distribution at x. Denote Γσ as the set of all possible
distributions over the action space for each x, which is compact and convex. We further
assume that ρ ∈ Γρ, ζ ∈ Γζ and σ(x) ∈ Γσ for each x ∈ X.
Definition 6.1. Consider the action distribution ρ, the randomized policy σ and the
stationary surplus distribution ζρ: (i) Given the action distribution ρ, determine the
success probabilities in the lottery scheme using (13) and then compute the value func-
tion in (14). Taking the best response given by (14) results in an action distribution σ˜;
(ii) Given action distribution ρ, following the randomized policy σ yields transition ker-
nels for the surplus Markov chain and stationary surplus distribution ζ˜ρ, (with each
transition kernel having a unique stationary distribution); and (iii) Given the station-
ary surplus distribution ζρ, applying the randomized policy σ(x) at each surplus x
yields the distribution of actions ρ˜. Define the best response mapping Π∗ that maps
Γρ ⊗ Γ|X|σ ⊗ Γζ into itself. Then we say that the assumed action distribution ρ, random-
ized policy σ and stationary surplus distribution ζρ constitute a mean field equilibrium
(MFE) if Π∗ : ρ⊗ σ ⊗ ζρ 7→ ρ˜⊗ σ˜ ⊗ ζ˜ρ has (ρ, σ, ζρ) as a fixed point.
6.1. Existence of MFE
THEOREM 6.2. There exists an MFE of ρ, the randomized policy σ(x) at each surplus
x and ζ, such that ρ ∈ Γρ, σ(x) ∈ Γσ and ζ ∈ Γζ , ∀a ∈ A and ∀x ∈ X.
We will be specializing to the spaces Γρ,Γσ,Γζ and define the topologies being used
in the following proofs first.
(1) For the assumed action distribution ρ ∈ Γρ on the finite set A, all norms are equiv-
alent, we will consider the topology of uniform convergence, i.e., using the l∞ norm
given by ||ρ|| = maxa∈A ρ(a).
(2) For the randomized policy σ ∈ Γ|X|σ , we enumerate the elements in X as 1, 2, · · · ,
and consider the metric topology generated by norm ||σ|| = ∑∞j=1 2−j |σ(xj)|, where
|σ(x)| = maxa∈A σ(x, a). We consider the convergence of any sequence {σn}∞n=1 to σ
in this topological space.
(3) For the surplus distribution ζ on the countable set X, we consider the topology of
pointwise convergence, which can be shown to be equivalent to convergence in l∞,
i.e., uniform convergence, using coupling results presented in [Li et al. 2016b].
Note that from the definition of Γρ, Γσ and Γζ , they are already non-empty, convex
and compact. Furthermore, they are jointly convex. Then in order to show that the
mapping Π∗ satisfies the conditions of Kakutani fixed point theorem, we only need to
verify the following three lemmas.
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LEMMA 6.3. Given ρ, by taking the best response given by (14), we can obtain the
action distribution σ(x) for every x, which is upper semicontinuous in ρ.
Remark 6.4. As we have discussed earlier, since our state space and action space
are discrete, there might exist multiple best response actions when the agent solves the
dynamic program. Thus, a pure equilibrium might not exist. Since the best response
can be set-valued, we need to consider mixed strategies. In other words, the agent
needs to choose a randomized action policy for each state. Hence, the randomized policy
σ is critical in the construction of the MFE given in Definition 6.1.
LEMMA 6.5. Given ρ and σ(x), there exists a unique stationary surplus distribution
ζ(x), which is continuous in ρ and σ(x).
LEMMA 6.6. Given ζ(x) and σ(x), there exists a stationary action distribution ρ,
which is continuous in ζ(x) and σ(x).
7. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BEST RESPONSE POLICY
In this section, we characterize the best response policy under the assumption that Vρ
in (14) has some properties. Then we discuss the relations between the incremental
utility function u(x) and the optimal value function Vρ.
7.1. Existence of Threshold Policy
We make the assumption that given the action distribution ρ, Vρ(x) is increasing and
submodular in x when x ≤ −l; increasing and linear in x when −l ≤ x ≤ w; and
increasing and supermodular in x, when x ≥ w.
In Section 4, our lotteries are constructed such that the probability of winning mono-
tonically increases with the cost of the action. This when combined with the monotonic-
ity, submodularity (decreasing differences) for positive argument and supermodularl-
ity (increasing differences) for negative argument of Vρ yields the following character-
ization of the best response policy.
LEMMA 7.1. For any two action, say actions a1 and a2, suppose that θa1 > θa2 , so
that pρ,a1 > pρ,a2 , i.e., φ(pρ,a1) > φ(pρ,a2), then there is a threshold value of the surplus
queue for user such that preference order for the actions changes from one side of the
threshold to the other.
Using the same argument as Lemma 7.1, under the assumption that Vρ(x) is increas-
ing and submodular in x ∈ (−∞,∞), or increasing and supermodular in x ∈ (−∞,∞),
we can show the existence of a threshold policy.
7.2. Relations between incremental utility function u(x) and the optimal value function Vρ
7.2.1. Concave/Convex incremental utility function
LEMMA 7.2. Given the action distribution ρ, Vρ(x) is an increasing and submodular
(i.e., decreasing differences) function of x if u(x) is a concave and monotone increasing
function of x, supermodular (i.e., increasing differences) function of x if u(x) is a convex
and monotone increasing function of x.
Thus, from Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.1, the optimal policy takes a threshold form
for both concave and convex incremental utility function.
7.2.2. Conjecture for S-shaped prospect incremental utility function. We found numerically
that with an S-shaped utility function, the value function satisfies the super/sub-
modularity conditions on the positive/negative axis respectively. If this holds true in
general, then from Lemma 7.1, the optimal policy would take a threshold form, and
indeed this is what we observed numerically. However, we are not able to prove this
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result due to the implicit nature of the value function, and we can only conjecture that
this condition might hold for some class of S-shaped utility functions.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we developed a general framework for analyzing incentive schemes, re-
ferred to as nudge systems, to promote desirable behavior in societal networks by pos-
ing the problem in the form of a Mean Field Game (MFG). Our incentive scheme took
the form of awarding coupons in such that higher cost actions would correspond to
more coupons, and conducting a lottery periodically using these coupons as lottery
tickets. Using this framework, we developed results in the characteristics of the opti-
mal policy and showed the existence of the MFE.
We used the candidate setting of an LSE trying to promote demand-response in the
form of setting high setpoints in higher price time of the day in order to transfer energy
usage from a higher to a lower price time of day for an air conditioning application.
We conducted data driven simulations that accurately account for electricity prices,
ambient temperature and home air conditioning usage. We showed how the prospect
of winning at a lottery could potentially motivate customers to change their AC usage
patterns sufficiently that the LSE can more than recoup the reward cost through a
likely reduced expenditure in electricity purchase. Further, we showed that a lottery is
more effective than a fixed reward at enabling such desirable behavior and can attain
a better tradeoff between social value and LSE profits.
APPENDIX
A. PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL VALUE FUNCTION
Proof of Lemma 5.1
We first show that Tρf ∈ Φ for ∀f ∈ Φ. The proof then follows through a verification of
the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 in [Puterman 1994]. From the definition of Tρ in (15),
we have
|Tρf(x)| ≤ |u(x)|+ max
a(x)∈A
θa(x) + βmax(|f(x+ w)|, |f(x− l)|).
From this it follows that
sup
x∈X
|Tρf(x)|
Ω(x)
≤ sup
x∈X
|u(x)|
Ω(x)
+ sup
x∈X
maxa(x)∈A θa(x)
Ω(x)
+ βmax
(
sup
x∈X
|f(x+ w)|
Ω(x)
, sup
x∈X
|f(x− l)|
Ω(x)
)
.
Let x+ be the unique positive surplus such that u(x+) = 1 and x− be the unique
negative surplus such that u(x−) = −1. Note that Ω(x) is non-decreasing for x ≥ x−
and non-increasing for x ≤ x+. To avoid cumbersome algebra we will assume x+−w > 0
and x− + l > 0. Since Ω(x) ≥ |u(x)| ≥ 0 and Ω(x) ≥ 1, the first two terms are bounded
by 1 and maxa(x)∈A θa(x). For the last term we have
sup
x∈X
|f(x+ w)|
Ω(x)
≤ ‖f‖Ω sup
x∈X
Ω(x+ w)
Ω(x)
.
We have the following
Ω(x+ w)
Ω(x)
=

u(x+w)
max(u(x),1) ≤ u(x+w)u(x) , if x ≥ x+,
u(x+w)
max(u(x),1) ≤ u(x+w)u(x+) , if x ∈ [x+ − w, x+],
1, if x ∈ [x−, x+ − w],
1
|u(x)| ≤ 1, if x ∈ [x− − w, x−],
u(x+w)
u(x) ≤ 1, if x ≤ x− − w.
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For x ≥ x+, we know using monotonicity of u(·)
u(x+ w)
u(x)
= 1 +
u(x+ w)− u(w)
w
w
u(x)
≤ 1 + u(x+ w)− u(w)
w
w.
Additionally, for x ∈ [x+ − w, x+] we have
u(x+ w)
u(x+)
= 1 +
u(x+ w)− u(x+)
x+ w − x+ (x+ w − x+) ≤ 1 +
u(x+ w)− u(x+)
x+ w − x+ w.
For the analysis we assume that u(·) is Lipschitz such that supx∈X u′(x) < +∞. There-
fore, by the mean value theorem
u(x+ w)− u(x)
w
= u′(ξ1) ≤ sup
x≥x+
u′(x), ∀ξ1, x ∈ [x+,∞),
u(x+ w)− u(x+)
x+ w − x+ = u
′(ξ2) ≤ sup
x∈[x+−w,x+]
u′(x), ∀ξ2, x ∈ [x+ − w, x+],
sup
x∈X
Ω(x+ w)
Ω(x)
≤ ‖f‖Ω(1 + w sup
x≥x+−w
u′(x)), ∀x ∈ [x+ − w,∞).
Similarly, we have
sup
x∈X
|f(x− l)|
Ω(x)
≤ ‖f‖Ω sup
x∈X
Ω(x− l)
Ω(x)
.
Now we have the following
Ω(x− l)
Ω(x)
=

u(x−l)
min(u(x),−1) ≤ u(x−l)u(x) , if x ≤ x−,
u(x−l)
max(u(x),−1) ≤ u(x−l)u(x−) , if x ∈ [x−, x− + l],
1, if x ∈ [x− + l, x+],
1
u(x) ≤ 1, if x ∈ [x+, x+ + l],
u(x−l)
u(x) ≤ 1, if x ≤ x+l.
Using the same logic as before, we get
sup
x∈X
Ω(x− l)
Ω(x)
≤ ‖f‖Ω(1 + l sup
x∈X:x≤x−
u′(x)).
Since u(·) is Lipschitz, thus, there exists an α0 ∈ (0,+∞) such that ‖Tρf‖Ω ≤ α0.
Next, we need to verify the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 in [Puterman 1994]. The
lemma requires verification of the following three conditions. We set x[k] to be the
state variable denoting the surplus at time k. We need to show that ∀x ∈ X, for some
constants (independent of ρ) α1 > 0, α2 > 0 and 0 < α3 < 1,
sup
a(x)∈A
|u(x)− θa(x)| ≤ α1Ω(x), (19)
Ex[1],a0 [Ω(x[1])|x[0] = x] ≤ α2Ω(x), ∀a0 ∈ A, (20)
with the distribution of x[1] chosen based on action a0, and
βJEx[J],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x] ≤ α3Ω(x), (21)
for some J > 0 and all possible action sequences, i.e., aj ∈ A for all j = 0, 1, . . . , J −
1 with the distribution of x[J ] chosen based on the action sequence (a0, a1, . . . , aJ−1)
chosen.
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First consider (19). Since Ω(x) = max(|u(x)|, 1), using the earlier analysis in Sec-
tion 4, (19) is true with α1 = 1 + maxa∈A θa. Now consider (20). We have
Ex[1],a0 [Ω(x[1])|x[0] = x] = Eρ[φ(pρ,a(x))Ω(x+ w) + φ(1− pρ,a(x)),Ω(x− l)]
≤ max(Ω(x+ w),Ω(x− l)),
which is bounded by α2Ω(x) using our analysis from before.
Finally, (21) holds true using the properties of Ω(·), the bounds on the probability
of winning and losing (from Section 4) and our analysis from earlier in the proof as
follows:
βJEx[J],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x]
≤βJ max(φ(pW ), φ(1− pW ))J max(Ω(x+ Jw),Ω(x− Jl))
≤(βmax(φ(pW ), φ(1− pW ))Jα4(J)Ω(x),
for some affine α4(J) > 0 using our analysis from before. It now follows that take J
large enough we obtain an α3 < 1 that is also independent of ρ. Note that we can get a
simpler bound of
βJEx[J],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x] ≤ βJα4(J)Ω(x),
using just the properties of Ω(·). Again we can take J large enough to obtain a α3 <
1 that is independent of ρ. This bound is useful when there is an action for which
the probability of winning or losing is 1. Since all the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 of
[Puterman 1994] are met, then the first result in the lemma holds true. The second
then follows immediately from (14).
Proof of Lemma 5.2
For any given ρ, from Lemma 5.1 we know that there is a unique Vρ(·). Furthermore,
it is the unique fixed point of operator Tρ where T Jρ is a contraction mapping with
constant α3 that is independent of ρ. From (15), it follows that T Jρ is a continuous in ρ:
computing derivatives using the envelope theorem and the expressions from Section 4,
it is easily established that T Jρ is, in fact, Lipschitz with constant (M − 1)J when the
uniform norm is used for ρ.
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be two population/action profiles such that ‖ρ1 − ρ2‖ ≤  (the choice
of norm is irrelevant as all are equivalent for finite dimensional Euclidean spaces). As
T Jρ is continuous in ρ, there exists a δ > 0 such that ‖T Jρ1Vρ2 − T Jρ2Vρ2‖Ω ≤ δ. However,
since T Jρ2Vρ2 = Vρ2 , we have shown that ‖T Jρ1Vρ2 − Vρ2‖Ω ≤ δ. Applying T Jρ1 n times and
using the contraction property of T Jρ1 , we get
‖T (n+1)Jρ1 Vρ2 − TnJρ1 Vρ2‖Ω ≤ αn3 δ.
The proof then follows since limn→∞ ‖TnJρ1 Vρ2 − Vρ1‖Ω = 0 so that
‖Vρ1 − Vρ2‖Ω ≤
∞∑
n=0
‖T (n+1)Jρ1 Vρ2 − TnJρ1 Vρ2‖Ω ≤
δ
1− α3 .
Furthermore, using the comment from above we can show that Vρ is Lipschitz contin-
uous in ρ.
B. THE EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF STATIONARY SURPLUS DISTRIBUTION
Proof of Lemma 5.3
First, from the transition kernel (17), we satisfy the Doeblin condition as
P(x[k] ∈ B|x[k − 1] = x) ≥ (1− β)Ψ(B),
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where 0 < β < 1, and Ψ is a probability measure for the regeneration process. Then
from results in [Meyn and Tweedie 2009, Chapter 12], we have a unique stationary
surplus distribution.
Next, let −τ be the last time before 0 that the surplus has a regeneration. Then we
have
ζρ×σ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
P(B, τ = k) =
∞∑
k=0
P(B|τ = k) · P(τ = k). (22)
Since the regeneration process happens independently of the surplus with inter-
regeneration times geometrically distributed with parameter (1− β), then P(τ = k) =
(1− β)βk. Also given τ = k, we have X−k ∼ Ψ. Therefore
ζρ×σ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkP(B|τ = k) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkE (E (1x[0]∈B |τ = k,X−k = X) |τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkE
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)|τ = k
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βk
∫
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x)dΨ(x). (23)
B.1. Existence of MFE
Proof of Lemma 6.3
Define the increasing and piecewise linear convex function
gρ(y) = max
a∈A
φ(pρ,a)y − θa = max
σ∈∆(|A|)
∑
a∈A
σa
(
φ(pρ,a)y − θa
)
, (24)
where ∆(A) is the probability simplex on A = |A| elements. By the properties of the
lottery and the weight function φ(·), φ(pρ,a) is continuous in ρ for all a ∈ A. Using
Berge’s maximum theorem, we have
arg max
σ∈∆(|A|)
∑
a∈A
σa (φ(pρ,a)y − θa) (25)
is upper semicontinuous in ρ.
Now let
A(y) := arg max g(y) = arg max
a∈A
φ(pρ,a)y − θa, (26)
then set-valued function above is exactly ∆(|A(y)|).
Hence, the optimal randomized policies at surplus x are a set-valued function
∆(|A(y)|) = ∆(|A(Vρ(x + w) − Vρ(x − l))|), which is upper semicontinuous due to the
Lipschitz continuity of Vρ(·) in ρ and the u.s.c. of φ(pρ,a) in ρ, i.e., for every state x, the
action distribution σ(x) is (pointwise) upper semicontinuous in ρ.
Proof of Lemma 6.5
The existence and uniqueness of ζ(x) for a given ρ and σ(x), and the relationship
between ζ(·) and ζ(k)(·) are shown in Lemma 5.3. Now, we will prove the continuity of
ζρ×σ in ρ and σ(x) for every surplus x ∈ X. For the assumed action distribution ρ on
the finite set A, we consider the topology of pointwise convergence which is equivalent
to the uniform convergence by strong coupling results in [Li et al. 2016b]. For the
randomized action distribution σ, corresponding to σ(x) at each surplus x ∈ X, we
consider the topology with metric ρ(σ1, σ2) =
∑∞
j=1 2
−j min(‖σ1(xj)−σ2(xj)‖, 1), where
‖ · ‖ is any norm for R|A|.
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First, we will show that the surplus distribution ζ(k)ρ×σ is continuous in ρ and σ. By
Portmanteau theorem, we only need to show that for any sequence ρn → ρ uniformly,
σn → σ pointwise, and any open set B, we have lim infn→∞ ζ(k)ρn×σn(B|x) ≥ ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x).
LEMMA B.1. lim infn→∞ ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) ≥ ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x).
Proof of Lemma B.1
The proof proceeds by induction on k. For k = 0, ζ(0)ρn×σn(B|x) = 1(x∈B) is a point-
mass at x irrespective of ρn × σn, and in fact, for any n ∈ N+, we have ζ(0)ρn×σn(B|x) =
ζ
(0)
ρ×σ(B|x). Let ρn → ρ uniform, and σn(x) → σ(x) pointwise for every surplus x. We
will show that ζ(k)ρn×σn(B|x) converges pointwise to ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x).
We will refer to the measure and random variables corresponding to ρn × σn for the
nth system and those corresponding to ρ × σ as coming from the limiting system. We
will prove that ζ(k)ρn×σn(B|x) converges to ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x) pointwise using the metrics given
above.
Suppose that the hypothesis holds true for k − 1 where k > 1, i.e., ζ(k−1)ρn×σn(B|x)
converges pointwise to ζ(k−1)ρ×σ (B|x). To prove this lemma, we only need to show that
the hypothesis holds for k. Let Pρ×σ,x(·) be the one-step transition probability mea-
sure of the surplus dynamics conditioned on the initial state of the surplus being
x, and there is no regeneration. Then we have Pρn×σn,x(x + w) =
∑
a∈σn(x) pρn×σn,a,
Pρn×σn,x(x−l) = 1−
∑
a∈σn(x) pρn×σn,a and Pρ×σ,x(x+w) =
∑
a∈σ(x) pρ×σ,a, Pρ×σ,x(x−l) =
1−∑a∈σ(x) pρ×σ,a. By the properties of the lottery, pρ×σ,a is continuous in ρ× σ for all
a ∈ A, thus we have pρn×σn,a converges to pρ×σ,a pointwise, i.e., Pρn×σn,x(·) converges
to Pρ×σ,x(·) pointwise. By the Skorokhod representation theorem [Billingsley 2013],
there exist random variables Xn and X on common probability space and a random
integer N such that Xn ∼ Pρn×σn,x(·) for all n ∈ N, and X ∼ Pρ×σ,x(·) , and Xn = X for
n ≥ N .
Then we have,
lim inf
n→∞ ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) = lim infn→∞ E
(
ζ
(k−1)
ρn×σn(B|Xn)
)
≥ E
(
lim inf
n→∞ ζ
(k−1)
ρn×σn(B|Xn)
)
≥ E
(
ζ
(k−1)
ρ×σ (B|X)
)
= ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x), (27)
where the second and third inequality hold due to Fatou’s lemma and the induction
hypothesis. Hence, for a given ρ and randomized policies σ(x), the unique stationary
surplus distribution ζ(k)ρn×σn(B|x) converges pointwise to ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x).
Now by Lemma 5.3 and Equation (18), we need to show that lim infn→∞ ζρn×σn(B) ≥
ζρ×σ(B). By Fatou’s lemma, we have
lim inf
n→∞ ζρn×σn(B) = lim infn→∞
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|Xn)
)
≥
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
lim inf
n→∞ ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|Xn)
)
≥
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)
)
= ζρ×σ(B).
(28)
Thus, for a given ρ and the randomize policies σ(x), the unique stationary surplus dis-
tribution ζρn×σn converges pointwise to ζρ×σ. Then the stationary surplus distribution
ζρ×σ is continuous in ρ and σ(x) for every surplus x ∈ X.
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Proof of Lemma 6.6
Given the stationary surplus distribution ζ(x) and the action distribution σ(x) at
every surplus x, those will introduce a population profile based on the actions chosen at
each point x, denoted that action distribution as ρ, and we have ρa =
∑
x∈X ζ(x) ·σa(x),
where a ∈ A, X is a countable set and A is a finite set.
To show that ρ is continuous in ζ(x) and σ(x), we only need to show that for any se-
quence {ζn}∞n=1 converging to ζ in uniform norm, {σn(x)}∞n=1 converging to σ(x) point-
wise, we have {ρn}∞n=1 converges to ρ pointwise, which is equivalent to convergence in
uniform norm as we have a finite set A.
Since ζn → ζ uniformly, we have ∀1 > 0, ∃N1 ∈ N, so that ∀n ≥ N1, ∀x ∈ X,
|ζn(x)− ζ(x)| ≤ 1. Similarly, {σn(x)}∞n=1 converges to σ(x) pointwise, we have ∀x ∈ X,
and ∀2 > 0, ∃N2 ∈ N so that ∀n ≥ N2, , |σn(x) − σ(x)| ≤ 2. Now consider ∀ =
max(1, 2), we can find an all but finite subset X1 of X, such that
∑
x∈X1 ζ(x) ≤ 2 . Let
N = max(N1, N2), for ∀x ∈ X\X1, ∃n > N large enough, such that |σn,a(x)−σa(x)| ≤ 2 .
Then ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, we have
|ρn,a − ρa| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
ζn(x)σn,a(x)−
∑
x
ζ(x)σa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
ζn(x)σn,a(x)−
∑
x
ζn(x)σa(x) +
∑
x
ζn(x)σa(x)−
∑
x
ζ(x)σa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
ζn(x)σn,a(x)−
∑
x
ζn(x)σa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
ζn(x)σa(x)−
∑
x
ζ(x)σa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
x
ζn(x)|σn,a(x)− σa(x)|+
∑
x
σa(x)|ζn(x)− ζ(x)|
=
∑
x∈X1
ζn(x)|σn,a(x)− σa(x)|+
∑
x∈X\X1
ζn(x)|σn,a(x)− σa(x)|+
∑
x
σa(x)|ζn(x)− ζ(x)|
(a)
≤
∑
x∈X1
ζn(x) · 1 +
∑
x∈X\X1
ζn(x) · 
2
+
∑
x
σa(x) · 1
(b)
≤ 
2
· 1 + 1 · 
2
+ 1 · 1 ≤  · 1 +  · 1 = 2, (29)
where (a) follows from the fact that |σn,a(x) − σa(x)| ≤ 1 for ∀x ∈ X, and |σn,a(x) −
σa(x)| < 2 , for x ∈ X \X1 given  > 0 and n large enough, and the convergence of ζn. (b)
follows from that
∑
x∈X1 ζ(x) <

2 for x ∈ X1.
Therefore, |ρn,a − ρa| < 2 for all a ∈ A and ∀n ≥ N , hence ρn → ρ pointwise, which
is equivalent to convergence in uniform norm as we have a finite set A.
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BEST RESPONSE POLICY
Proof of Lemma 7.1
First, we consider x ∈ X and x ≥ 0. We have
u(x)− θa2(x) + β[pρ,a2(x)Vρ(x+ w) + (1− pρ,a2(x))Vρ(x− l)]
≷ u(x)− θa1(x) + β[pρ,a1(x)Vρ(x+ w) + (1− pρ,a1(x))Vρ(x− l)]
⇔ θa1(x) − θa2(x) ≷ β[(pρ,a1(x)− pρ,a2(x))Vρ(x+ w)
+ ((1− pρ,a1(x))− (1− pρ,a2(x)))Vρ(x− l)]
⇔ θa1(x) − θa2(x) ≷ β(pρ,a1(x)− pρ,a2(x))[Vρ(x+ w)− Vρ(x− l)]. (30)
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As we assumed θa1(x) > θa2(x), it follows that pρ,a1(x) > pρ,a2(x). Also, since w + l > 0
and Vρ(x) is increasing in x, so both sides of the above inequality are non-negative.
Since Vρ(x) is submodular when x ≥ −l, the RHS is a decreasing function of x. Let
x∗a1,a2 ∈ X be the smallest value such that LHS ≥ RHS, then for all x > x∗a1,a2 action
a2(x) is preferred to action a1(x), for all x < x∗a1,a2 action a1(x) is preferred to action
a2(x), and finally, if at x∗a1,a2 LHS=RHS, then at x
∗
a1,a2 the agent is indifferent between
the two actions, and if instead LHS > RHS, then action a2(x) is preferred to action
a1(x). We call x∗a1,a2 the threshold value of surplus for actions a1(x) and a2(x).
Similarly, for x ∈ X and x ≤ 0, Vρ(x) is supermodular when x ≤ w, which implies the
existence of a threshold policy.
Proof of Lemma 7.2
First, let f ∈ Φ, suppose that f is an increasing and submodular function. First we
prove that Tρf is increasing and submodular too. Let a∗(x) be an optimal action in the
definition of Tρf(x) when the surplus is x, i.e., one of the maximizers from (15). Let
x1 > x2, then
Tρf(x1)− Tρf(x2) = u(x1)− u(x2)− θa∗(x1) + θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x1)(x1)f(x1 + w)+
(1− pρ,a∗(x1)(x1))f(x1 − l)− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)− (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]
≥ u(x1)− u(x2)− θa∗(x2) + θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x1 + w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x1 − l)− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)− (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]
= u(x1)− u(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x1 + w + a)− f(x2 + w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))(f(x1 − l)− f(x2 − l))
] ≥ 0.
The first inequality holds because a∗(x2) need not be an optimal action when the sur-
plus is x1.
Again, let x1 > x2 and let x > 0. Since u(·) is a concave function, it follows that it is
submodular, i.e.,
u(x1 + x)− u(x1) ≤ u(x2 + x)− u(x2)⇔ u(x1 + x) + u(x2) ≤ u(x2 + x) + u(x1).
Assuming that f ∈ Φ is submodular, we will now show that Tρf is also submodular.
Consider
Tρf(x1 + x) + Tρf(x2) = u(x1 + x) + u(x2)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2)
+ β
[
pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x)f(x1 + x+ w) + pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))f(x1 + x− l) + (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]
.
We assume without loss of generality that pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x) ≥ pρ,a∗(x2)(x2) and let δ
be the difference; if pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x) ≤ pρ,a∗(x2)(x2), then a similar proof establishes
the result. Using this we have the RHS (denoted by d) being
d = u(x1 + x) + u(x2)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 + w))
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))(f(x1 + x− l) + f(x2 − l)) + δ(f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 − l))
]
.
By submodularity of f(·) we have
f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 + w) ≤ f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 + w),
f(x1 + x− l) + f(x2 − l) ≤ f(x2 + x− l) + f(x1 − l),
f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 − l) ≤ f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 − l).
With these and using the submodularity of u(·) we get
d ≤ u(x2 + x) + u(x1)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 + w))
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+ (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))(f(x2 + x− l) + f(x1 − l)) + δ(f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 − l))
]
= u(x2 + x)− θa∗(x1+x) + β[pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + x+ w) + (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 + x− l)]
+ u(x1)− θa∗(x2) + β[pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x1 + w) + (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))f(x1 − l)]
≤ Tρf(x2 + x) + Tρf(x1),
where the last inequality holds as using the optimal actions (a∗(x2 +x), a∗(x1)) yields a
higher value as opposed to the sub-optimal actions (a∗(x1+x), a∗(x2)) when the surplus
is x2 + x and x1.
Since both the monotonicity and submodularity properties are preserved when tak-
ing pointwise limits, choosing f(·) ≡ 0 (or u(·)) to start the value iteration proves that
the value function Vρ(·) is increasing and submodular.
Similarly, if f ∈ Φ is an increasing and supermodular function, following the same
argument, we can prove that the value function Vρ(·) is increasing and supermodular.
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